Legal Insights October 18, 2026 By David Traywick

Trapped Under Declarant Control: How SC Developers Keep Your HOA Board

South Carolina has no statute limiting how long a developer can control your HOA — unlike Florida, which forces turnover within months of 90% sellout. Here the declaration sets the rules, and the developer wrote the declaration. How declarant control works, the sham-turnover trick behind a $1.75 million verdict, and what turnover actually requires.

Half-built South Carolina subdivision at dusk, illustrating developer control of an HOA

"The developer is also the HOA president." "They get more votes per lot than each homeowner." "The community has no say in anything HOA related — there are no votes and no way for the community to take over the HOA."

Those are real homeowners describing declarant control — the period when the developer who built your neighborhood also runs the association that governs it. Every new community goes through it. The question is whether yours ever ends. In South Carolina, the answer is uncomfortably often "not yet," because this state has no law that forces it to end. This post — part of Traywick Law's series on HOA problems in South Carolina — explains how declarant control works, the tricks developers use to extend it, what a real turnover requires, and how homeowners take their board back.

What Is Declarant Control? How South Carolina Developers Keep Your HOA Board

Before selling a single lot, the developer forms the HOA as a South Carolina nonprofit corporation, adopts its bylaws, appoints its initial board — typically the developer's own principals, employees, or lawyers — and then records a declaration of covenants that names the developer as "declarant" and reserves special declarant rights: to appoint and remove board members, to annex additional phases, to exercise architectural control, to veto amendments. (The 2018 SC Homeowners Association Act defines "declarant" at S.C. Code § 27-30-120(2) — either someone selling units as part of a common promotional plan or anyone who reserves or succeeds to a special declarant right.)

The developer is, in other words, the association's creator, its initial only member, its board, and the author of the rules that govern the transition away from itself. The fox designs the henhouse's bylaws. While the developer still owns most of the lots, the declaration gives it control through some combination of appointment power, weighted voting, and veto rights — and every transaction the "board" approves during that period has the developer sitting on both sides of the table.

South Carolina Has No Law Limiting How Long a Developer Can Control Your HOA

This is the structural fact that makes South Carolina different. Florida forces turnover within three months after 90% of parcels are conveyed (Fla. Stat. § 720.307). Colorado and Oregon impose multi-year caps. South Carolina has no statutory cap on declarant control at all. No statutory turnover procedure. The duration of developer control is whatever the declaration says — and declarations can, and sometimes do, let the developer control the board for a decade or more, or until a trigger event (75–90% sellout, a fixed anniversary, the developer's voluntary surrender) that the developer itself can often delay by slow-walking sales or phasing new sections.

The typical SC declaration triggers transition on some combination of: conveyance of 75–90% of lots to non-declarant owners; a fixed anniversary, commonly 5–10 years from the declaration's recording; or the developer's voluntary early surrender (often timed to shed liability, not to empower homeowners). If your declaration's trigger hasn't fired — or the developer has engineered it not to fire — the "transition" never comes. This is the structural root of most SC developer-abuse disputes, and it is why the first document in every case is the declaration's declarant-rights section.

The Control Toolkit: Weighted Votes, Appointment Power, and Veto Rights

Developers keep control through three mechanisms, often used together:

Direct appointment power. The declarant appoints — and removes — some or all directors. In Walbeck v. I'On Co., the developers retained the power to appoint, remove, and replace board members for up to 20 years. The Court of Appeals held that retained power made them fiduciaries of the HOA and its members.

Weighted voting. The classic formula gives the developer multiple votes per lot owned versus one vote per lot for homeowners — 3-to-1 is common, and Goddard v. Fairways Development featured a Class B scheme giving the developer 50 votes per lot against homeowners' one. Weighted voting lets the developer keep majority control long after selling half the lots. When homeowners ask "how to remove the developer from the HOA board," the answer usually starts with counting the votes — and finding the developer still has most of them.

Veto rights. Specified board actions require declarant approval. A veto is quieter than appointment power and survives in more declarations than homeowners realize — which is exactly what makes sham turnover possible.

The 7-Stage Developer Lifecycle: From Raw Land to Homeowner Control

Every SC community follows the same lifecycle. Each stage is governed by specific documents, and each stage creates the leverage the developer uses in the next:

Stage 1 — Raw land. The developer (usually a single-purpose LLC) buys acreage, rezones, and gets plat approval. No association, no homeowners, no restrictions yet.

Stage 2 — The developer creates its own counterparty. Before selling a lot, the developer files articles of incorporation for the HOA ($25 filing fee), adopts bylaws, and appoints the initial board from its own people. The association exists on paper but has no independent life.

Stage 3 — The declaration. The developer records the Declaration of CC&Rs (or master deed for condos) in the county land records. This is the community's constitution: it creates servitudes that run with the land, names the declarant, reserves special declarant rights, imposes mandatory membership and assessment liens, and describes the common areas. Since May 17, 2018, S.C. Code § 27-30-130 adds a critical formality — governing documents must be recorded to be enforceable.

Stage 4 — Declarant control. The developer rules through appointment power, weighted votes, and vetoes. This is when the abuse toolkit gets used: interested directors, sweetheart contracts with developer affiliates, self-dealing conveyances, and artificially low assessments that starve reserves.

Stage 5 — The transitional board. Many declarations provide an intermediate phase: as sellout crosses a threshold, homeowners elect a minority of directors while the developer still appoints the majority. The first homeowner directors discover the books, the contracts, and the condition of the common areas. This is when disputes usually surface.

Stage 6 — Turnover. At the declaration's trigger, developer-appointed directors resign and homeowners elect a new board. What must change hands: corporate records (articles, bylaws, minutes, member rolls, contracts, insurance, financials, bank accounts), common-area deeds, and — in theory — funds and reserves. (Our companion posts cover the developer dumping playbook that so often detonates at this stage, and the full mechanics of HOA turnover from developer to homeowners.)

Stage 7 — Post-turnover. The developer's voting control ends, but its legal exposure doesn't. Under Concerned Dunes West Residents v. Georgia-Pacific and Walbeck, the developer's fiduciary duty as to common areas is judged at the time of transfer — liability for conveying defective common areas or inadequate reserves survives turnover. And under Magnolia North Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Heritage Cmtys., the limitations clock on the developer's fiduciary-duty claim doesn't start until turnover — the breach occurs at transfer, when defective common areas or inadequate reserves change hands.

What "Turnover" Actually Requires (It's Not a Press Release)

Developers love announcing turnover. A real one has content, and homeowners should test the announcement against this checklist:

  1. Resignation of developer-appointed directors and election of a homeowner board under the declaration's procedures — not a handpicked successor slate.
  2. Delivery of corporate records: articles, bylaws, all minutes, the membership roll, every contract (especially with developer affiliates), insurance policies, financial statements, and control of the bank accounts.
  3. Deeds to the common areas — fee title to roads, ponds, parks, drainage, clubhouses, whatever the declaration designated for the association.
  4. Funds and reserves adequate to the association's obligations — or an honest accounting of their absence, which is itself the basis for a claim.
  5. Relinquishment of superior voting power and veto rights. This is the one that matters legally: under Walbeck, the developer's fiduciary relationship with the HOA is extinguished "when a Developer turns over control of the HOA to its members by relinquishing its superior voting power." 439 S.C. at 585 n.11. Until that happens, turnover is nominal.

If any of the five is missing, you don't have turnover. You have a press release.

Sham Turnover: When the Developer Claims to Leave but Keeps the Veto

The Walbeck verdict — $1.75 million, reinstated by the SC Supreme Court in 2023 — is the cautionary tale. The I'On developers promised in a 1998 HUD property report to convey a community dock, boat ramp, and creekside park to the HOA free of liens at no cost. Instead they kept the amenities, granted easements over them to third parties,   secretly sold lot CV-6 for $1.4 million — while retaining veto power over the HOA board.

That retained veto is the anatomy of sham turnover: the developer steps off the board, keeps the strings, and continues making decisions that benefit its own interests at the association's expense. The Supreme Court's holding — "Developers owe fiduciary duties to homeowners and homeowners' associations regarding common areas," 439 S.C. at 585 — applies with full force to the developer that claims to have turned over control while keeping veto power. The fiduciary relationship survives nominal turnover. Pre-turnover breaches survive actual turnover. And the business judgment rule does not save a self-dealing developer: Walbeck I expressly rejected the argument that the BJR precludes a fiduciary relationship between a developer in control and the association's members.

If your developer "turned over" the HOA but still approves (or blocks) board actions, still controls the amenities, or still hasn't conveyed the common areas it promised — you may be living in a sham turnover, and the fiduciary-duty clock is still running in your favor.

Red Flags: How to Tell Your Developer Isn't Letting Go

Homeowners usually sense it before they can prove it. The red flags:

  • The turnover trigger in the declaration fired — 90% sold, the anniversary passed — and nothing happened.
  • The board president is the developer's principal, employee, or lawyer.
  • Homeowner directors are outvoted or frozen out; records requests go unanswered. (At North Charleston's Magnolia Pointe, a developer-run HOA with overdue turnover, residents' requests for financial records went unanswered despite the state's record-inspection law.)
  • The developer amends the declaration unilaterally to extend its own control.
  • Common areas promised in marketing materials get conveyed elsewhere — the Chandelle POA v. Armstrong pattern, where a developer promised a runway as an owner-association amenity and conveyed it to a different entity.
  • Assessments stay suspiciously low while reserves stay at zero — the setup for the special-assessment shock that hits after the developer exits.

The Conflict-of-Interest Rules Developers Break Most

During declarant control, the same individuals sit on both sides of every transaction: officers of the developer entity and directors of the HOA, voting the HOA into deals with the developer. S.C. Code § 33-31-831 governs those conflict transactions, and it is mechanical:

  • An "indirect interest" is defined expansively: another entity in which the director has a material interest or is a general partner, or of which the director is a director, officer, or trustee, is a party. A director who is president of the developer-LLC on one side and HOA director on the other is the textbook case.
  • For mutual-benefit corporations (which HOAs are), the transaction must be approved after disclosure by the board or the members.
  • Approval requires a majority of the directors with no direct or indirect interest — and "a transaction may not be authorized, approved, or ratified under this section by a single director." If every director is the developer's person, there is no disinterested majority, and the transaction was never properly authorized.
  • On member approval, interested members' votes — and votes they control — may not be counted.

Kiawah Resort Assocs., L.P. v. Kiawah Island Cmty. Ass'n, Inc., 421 S.C. 538, 808 S.E.2d 521 (Ct. App. 2017), is the closest authority — with a limit homeowners should know. In that case the master ruled that a nonprofit community association may transact business with an interested director, but the transaction must be properly authorized, and that because disinterested homeowner directors never voted, the interested directors' say-so could not establish the association's intent. The Court of Appeals affirmed on a different ground — the developer failed to prove mutual mistake by clear and convincing evidence — and did not expressly adopt the § 33-31-831 reasoning. One candid limit: no published SC case was found actually voiding a nonprofit conflict transaction under § 831, so the voidability argument rests on the statute's text plus the master's reasoning in Kiawah, not on a rescission precedent. Plead it that way.

 Can the Developer Change the Covenants Whenever It Wants?

Developers routinely claim a reserved right to amend the declaration unilaterally — and sometimes use it to extend their own control or strip homeowner protections. The bounds come from Queen's Grant II Horizontal Property Regime v. Greenwood Dev. Corp., 368 S.C. 342, 628 S.E.2d 902 (Ct. App. 2006), which sets five conditions for a developer's unilateral covenant amendment: (1) an unambiguous reservation of the amendment power in the original declaration; (2) sufficient property interest held by the developer at the time of amendment; (3) strict compliance with the amendment procedure; (4) strict notice per the declaration and the law; and (5) the amendment must not be unreasonable, indefinite, or against public policy.

Fail any one, and the amendment is vulnerable. Note the case's scope: the full opinion contains zero discussion of fiduciary duty, the business judgment rule, or bad faith — it is a covenant-amendment case, and it should be used only for declarant-power points. But for the common developer move of rewriting the rules midstream to protect itself, it is the test.

What If Years Have Passed? Getting Control Back

Homeowners who discover declarant-control abuse years in often assume they're too late. Often they aren't:

  • Equitable tolling tolls the clock.  Under Magnolia North, the limitations clock on the developer's fiduciary-duty claim didn’t start until turnover — because under Dunes West, the breach of the duty to convey common areas in good repair occurs at transfer, not during control. (Separately, equitable tolling or estoppel can apply to negligence claims where the developer's assurances induced the association to hold off.) The developer can’t run out a clock that only started after it left.
  • Members can remove member-elected directors without cause at a meeting called for that purpose with proper notice — including the entire elected board. S.C. Code § 33-31-808. But developer-appointed directors are removable by the appointer under § 33-31-809 — which is exactly why declarant control is hard to vote your way out of. Our post on HOA board elections covers how to run that fight — proxy rules, quorum fights, and rigged meetings.
  • Members holding 5% of voting power can seek judicial removal of a director for fraudulent or dishonest conduct or gross abuse of authority. S.C. Code § 33-31-810.
  • The AG can investigate. S.C. Code § 33-31-171 authorizes the Attorney General to investigate the organization, conduct, and management of any nonprofit operating in South Carolina — which includes nonprofit HOAs.
  • Sue derivatively. Harms to the association — sweetheart contracts, self-dealing conveyances, looted reserves — are pursued on the association's behalf under S.C. Code § 33-31-630 and Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP, including the pre-suit demand requirement. (Walbeck I dismissed derivative claims for failure to meet the demand requirement, but the Supreme Court reversed that dismissal in 2023, holding demand futile in light of the developers' continuing veto power — still, make the demand properly where it is not futile.)
  • Attack the contracts. South Carolina has no self-executing sweetheart-contract termination statute for non-condo HOAs (unlike the Restatement and UCIOA approaches other states adopted). Homeowner boards must attack developer-affiliate contracts through § 831 (never properly authorized), fiduciary-duty claims, or unconscionability — all litigation, none automatic.

The throughline: declarant control is a declaration problem with litigation solutions. The declaration tells you what the developer was allowed to do; the fiduciary-duty cases tell you what it wasn't; and the tolling doctrines mean the developer's long control often preserves — rather than defeats — the homeowners' claims.

Traywick Law Offices can analyze a declarant-control dispute — the declaration's trigger provisions, the board's composition and transactions, and whether turnover was real or a sham — and push for a favorable resolution efficiently. To get started, request a legal opinion through our intake page.